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PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
ENTRUSTED TO OTHERS IN BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: DATA BREACHES, IDENTITY
THEFT, AND TORT LIABILITY
Mark A. Geistfeld*
These days, it is almost impossible to be in business and not collect
or hold personally identifying information—names and addresses,
Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, or other account
numbers—about your customers, employees, business partners, stu-
dents, or patients.  If this information falls into the wrong hands, it
could put these individuals at risk for identity theft.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Because commerce is highly reliant on personally identifying infor-
mation that is meant to be confidential, the theft of such data has be-
come a profitable criminal enterprise.  “Like thieves [who] rob banks
because ‘that’s where the money is,’ computer attackers target
databases because that’s where the data is.”2  Once in possession of an
individual’s confidential identifying information, an “identity thief can
empty bank accounts, obtain credit cards, secure loans, open lines of
credit, connect telephone services, and enroll in government benefits
in a victim’s name.”3  The profitability of identity theft explains the
results of a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) study which found that
“[a]n estimated 17.6 million persons, or 7% of all U.S. residents age 16
or older, were victims of one or more incidents of identity theft in
2014.”4
* Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation, New York University School of
Law.  Financial support was provided by the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Re-
search Fund of the New York University School of Law.
1. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INFORMATION COMPROMISE AND THE RISK OF IDENTITY THEFT:
GUIDANCE FOR YOUR BUSINESS (2004), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps104327/ftc/www.ftc
.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus59.pdf.
2. Phillip Britt, Survey: Government Struggles with Data Breaches, INFO. TODAY, Jan. 2006, at
48–49 (alteration in original).
3. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at
the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 252 (2007).
4. ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, at 1
(2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit14.pdf.
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Many identity theft victims incur little or no out-of-pocket financial
loss.  According to the DOJ study, 35% of identity theft victims in
2014 suffered no direct or indirect financial cost—a measure that does
not include the time the victim spent to rectify matters.5  “Half of
identity theft victims who were able to resolve any associated
problems did so in a day or less.”6  Other victims were not so lucky.
Approximately 7% reported losses in excess of $100, with a mean loss
of $2,895.7  For those victims who were able to resolve the financial
and credit problems caused by the identity theft, “about 9% spent
more than a month” doing so (the rate rises to 32% if the victim “ex-
perienced multiple types of identity theft with existing accounts and
other fraud”).8  Confronted by the worrisome potential for financial
and credit problems, an “estimated 36% of identity theft victims re-
ported moderate or severe emotional distress as a result of the inci-
dent.”9  Extreme cases involve even greater expense and presumably
more distress.10
In light of the widespread incidence of identity theft and the corre-
sponding losses, lawsuits have predictably followed.  An empirical
study identified 230 data breach lawsuits filed in federal courts from
2000 to 2010, most of which involved class actions filed against “large
firms such as banks, medical/insurance entities, retailers, or other pri-
vate businesses. . . . [T]he vast majority of cases either settle, or are
dismissed, either as a matter of law, or because the plaintiff was una-
ble to demonstrate actual harm.”11  The study “identified over 86
unique causes of action (from only 231 cases) for essentially the same
event: the unauthorized disclosure of personal information,” and
“found 34 different kinds of tort causes of action, 15 contract, 4 viola-
tions of state statutes, and 33 violations of federal statutes.”12  As this
study shows, data breaches potentially implicate a wide array of liabil-
ity rules, but there is no claim that clearly dominates the others.
To evaluate the liability issues posed by tort litigation over data
breaches—defined for our purposes as the theft of one’s confidential
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 1, 6 tbl.6.
8. Id. at 1, 10.
9. Id. at 1.
10. See Citron, supra note 3, at 253 (citing data for a class of identity theft victims who on R
average incurred $16,971 in lost income, including an average of $1,000 in out-of-pocket ex-
penses, and over 600 hours of personal time).
11. Sasha Romanosky et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 74, 74–76 (2014).
12. Id. at 100.
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information entrusted to another in a business transaction,13 I will ad-
dress the negligence cause of action.  Negligence is the most common
type of tort claim according to this study.14  Negligence liability is also
the default tort rule governing accidental harms, and so an extended
analysis of these claims is likely to encompass the fundamental doctri-
nal issues and policy judgments involved in tort litigation over data
breaches.
The analysis shows why plaintiffs so far have had little success in
obtaining tort recovery for these instances of identity theft.  A negli-
gence claim requires a court to resolve apparently insurmountable is-
sues pertaining to the elements of duty,15 breach,16 and compensable
harm.17  For each of these elements, the black-letter rules would seem
to either bar the tort claim or make it extremely difficult for victims of
identity theft to recover for their losses.
Although courts have dismissed negligence claims for these reasons,
they have not adequately considered the underlying tort principles.
Tort claims for data breach turn on a number of issues that require
searching analysis, including the manner in which the economic loss
rule affects the tort duty, the relation between the negligence standard
of care and strict liability, and the appropriate forms of compensable
loss.  Substantive analysis of these issues shows that they all can be
resolved in favor of the negligence claim, which in turn justifies a rule
of strict liability.  Plaintiff customers are likely to face considerable
difficulties in proving that the theft of their confidential information
was caused by defendant businesses negligently breaching their obli-
gations to reasonably secure the data.  For reasons recognized by tort
law in analogous contexts, the evidentiary difficulties of proving negli-
gence can justify a rule of strict liability for enforcing the tort duty to
exercise reasonable care.18  When formulated in this manner, the rule
13. Data breaches can also be caused by software programs that enable an unauthorized third
party to hack into an individual’s computer and steal her confidential information. See generally
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553 (2005) (discussing the problem and proposing that software licensors
be subject to a tort duty requiring them to incorporate reasonable security measures into their
products and services).  In many of the data breach cases that are the subject of my analysis, the
cybersecurity problem will stem from the software that the defendant business licensed from a
third party.  To the extent that the defendant is subject to tort liability for the resultant identity
thefts, it becomes incentivized to deal with reputable third-party software licensors or otherwise
obtain a right to indemnity for these liabilities, thereby incentivizing these licensors to adopt
reasonable cybersecurity measures in the first instance.
14. Id. at 101 fig.7.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part III.
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of strict liability supplies the necessary means for customers to ade-
quately enforce the tort duty obligating businesses to adopt reasona-
ble precautions for protecting entrusted confidential information.
Tort liability in these cases ultimately finds justification in the impor-
tant public policy of maintaining the integrity of market transactions.
II. THE TORT DUTY
At first blush, the existence of a tort duty would seem to be straight-
forward in data breach cases.  An apt analogy is provided by tradi-
tional cases of bailment, in which the bailor gives possession of her
tangible property to the bailee, thereby obligating the bailee to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect that property.19  The same substantive
rationale for this tort duty extends to cases in which a customer has
entrusted her intangible, confidential information to another in the
course of a business transaction, thereby obligating the possessor to
exercise reasonable care in protecting that valuable property.
The duty can also be easily justified by fundamental tort principles.
For example, in a recent decision involving consolidated actions over
data theft of confidential customer information, the court held that
the existence of duty is “well supported by both common sense and
. . . Massachusetts law.”20  In support of its decision, the court cited a
Massachusetts case holding that “[a] basic principle of negligence law
is that ordinarily everyone has a duty to refrain from affirmative acts
that unreasonably expose others to a risk of harm.”21  These require-
ments are obviously satisfied for cases in which a business affirma-
tively collected a customer’s confidential personal information and
then failed to exercise reasonable care in protecting that entrusted in-
formation from theft, foreseeably causing injury to the customer.22
19. See Coggs v. Bernard, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (Q.B. 1704) (adopting the six types of bailments
and their associated standards of care as recognized by Roman law).
20. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
966 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (ruling on consolidated action of certain civil actions across country that had
been transferred to the court by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
21. Id. (quoting Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (1989)).
22. See also Bell v. Mich. Council, No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15,
2005) (per curiam) (holding that the “defendant did owe plaintiffs a duty to protect them from
identity theft by providing some safeguards to ensure the security of their most essential confi-
dential identifying information”). But see Cooney v. Chi. Pub. Sch., 943 N.E.2d 23, 28–29 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2010) (“Plaintiffs . . . contend that we should recognize a ‘new common law duty’ to
safeguard information.  They claim a duty is justified by the sensitive nature of personal data
such as dates of birth and social security numbers.  Plaintiffs do not cite to an Illinois case that
supports this argument.  While we do not minimize the importance of protecting this informa-
tion, we do not believe that the creation of a new legal duty beyond legislative requirements
already in place is part of our role on appellate review. . . .  [T]he legislature has specifically
addressed the issue and only required the [defendant] to provide notice of the disclosure.”).
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The same case, however, reveals the difficulties posed by such a
duty.  Plaintiffs had a contractual relationship with the defendant and
sought tort recovery only for pure economic losses caused by the iden-
tify theft, such as the expense of purchasing credit-monitoring ser-
vices.23  As the court explained, “Massachusetts generally prohibits
the recovery of purely economic losses in tort absent personal injury
or property damage.”24  This prohibition—known as the economic
loss rule—eliminates the tort obligation, because “a commercial user
can protect himself by seeking express contractual assurances . . . or
by obtaining insurance against losses.”25  Having first concluded that
the tort duty under Massachusetts law is a matter of “common sense,”
the court then summarily negated that duty with the economic loss
rule.
Although fundamental tort principles clearly establish that busi-
nesses owe a duty of reasonable care to protect the confidential infor-
mation of their customers, for cases in which a breach of that duty
causes only pure economic loss, the existence of that duty also de-
pends on the contractually based economic loss rule. To evaluate the
potential tort liabilities for data breaches, we need to consider how
the associated tort duty is affected by the contractually based eco-
nomic loss rule.
A. The Contractually Based Economic Loss Rule
In data breach cases, most identity theft victims only suffer eco-
nomic loss caused by the failure of a business to protect their confi-
dential information.26  According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
“there is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in
the performance . . . of a contract between the parties.”27  The obliga-
tion incurred by a business to protect a customer’s confidential infor-
mation is entailed by their contractual relationship, apparently
triggering the economic loss rule.
Even if the obligation to reasonably secure a customer’s confiden-
tial information is not expressly written into the contract, it neverthe-
less is an implied contractual term for reasons well described by one
court: “Ordinarily, a consumer does not expect—and certainly does
23. Id.
24. In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 967 & n.16 (quoting Bay State-Spray &
Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1354–55 (Mass. 1989)).
25. Id.
26. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.  The issue of damages for emotional distress R
caused by the underlying threat of financial loss is discussed in Part IV.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2012).
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not intend—the merchant to allow unauthorized third-parties to ac-
cess that data.  A jury could reasonably conclude, therefore, that an
implicit agreement to safeguard the data is necessary to effectuate the
contract.”28
Because the obligation of a business to exercise reasonable care in
protecting confidential customer information is an implied contractual
term of the transaction, a tort claim based on the theft of such data is
essentially alleging that the defendant business negligently performed
the contract or otherwise impliedly misrepresented that it would take
reasonable measures to protect that information.  If the tort claim
then seeks recovery only for the economic losses caused by the iden-
tity theft, the black-letter requirements of the economic loss rule are
clearly satisfied: the parties are in a contractual relationship; the plain-
tiff customer alleges that the defendant business negligently per-
formed the contract; and the plaintiff seeks tort recovery only for pure
economic loss.29  When applied in this manner, the economic loss rule
bars the tort claim by negating any tort duty requiring businesses to
exercise reasonable care to prevent third parties from gaining unau-
thorized access to confidential customer data.
This bar to recovery is not limited to negligence claims.  In tort law,
duty refers to the legal obligation owed by one party (the duty holder)
to another (the right holder).30  Without an antecedent legal obliga-
tion between the parties, there is no legal basis to impose tort liability
on the defendant for the plaintiff’s injuries.31  Thus, “[i]t is fundamen-
tal that the existence of a legally cognizable duty is a prerequisite to
all tort liability.”32  To be justifiable, a tort duty obligating a business
to protect confidential customer information—whether based on neg-
ligence or any other tort cause of action, such as privacy—must be
squared with the economic loss rule.
Although the black-letter formulation of the contractually based ec-
onomic loss rule apparently bars tort recovery in these cases, the rule
is more nuanced in application and requires further analysis.  Tort law
recognizes a cause of action for pure economic loss in a wide variety
of cases, including “negligent misrepresentation, defamation, profes-
sional malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, nuisance, loss of consor-
28. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 cmt. a.
30. Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992).
31. Id.
32. Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1993); see also Cippollone, 505 U.S. at 522
(holding that “common-law damages actions of the sort raised by petitioner [involving strict
products liability, negligence, express warranty and intentional tort claims] are premised on the
existence of a legal duty”).
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tium, wrongful death, spoliation of evidence, and unreasonable failure
to settle a claim within insurance policy limits.”33  Many of these
claims involve parties who are in contractual relationships, yet plain-
tiffs recover tort damages for their pure economic losses, which is in-
consistent with the black-letter formulation of the contractually based
economic loss rule.34  As one judge observed: “The inconsistent treat-
ment of the doctrine by use of varying analytical frameworks, does not
provide the bench and bar guidance in the proper application of the
doctrine.”35  Consequently, courts have “underscore[d] the desirabil-
ity—perhaps urgency—of harmonizing the entire complex and confus-
ing pattern of liability and nonliability for tortious conduct in
contractual settings.”36  The black-letter formulation of the economic
loss rule has not sufficiently harmonized the entire body of case law,
leading to the question of whether it provides adequate guidance for
resolving the novel issues involved in cases of identity theft caused by
the failure of a business to protect the confidential information of its
customers.
The economic loss rule is vexing because it takes different forms
that must be adequately distinguished.  The contractually based eco-
nomic loss rule differs from the economic loss rule that limits tort lia-
bility in noncontractual settings.37  Despite this important difference,
courts have not always identified which formulation they are relying
on to resolve tort claims for identity theft.38  Even when courts ex-
pressly invoke the contractually based economic loss rule, they are not
always clear about which version of the rule they are applying.39  The
contractually based economic loss rule has been formulated in two
distinct manners—one formal, the other substantive.  The two ver-
sions of the rule sometimes yield opposite outcomes, making it neces-
sary to recognize their differences.
To illustrate, consider how the formal and substantive versions of
the contractually based economic loss rule apply to cases in which the
parties are not in a contractual relationship or actual privity, but are
instead situated in a web of contracts placing them in near privity.
Because the formal (black-letter) version of the economic loss rule
33. Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 523, 530–32 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
34. Id.
35. Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 687 S.E.2d 47, 52 (S.C. 2009) (Beatty, J., concurring).
36. Rardin v. T & D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24, 30 (7th Cir. 1989).
37. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss
Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339 (2017).
38. See generally id.
39. See id.
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only bars the tort claim when it seeks to allocate liability for pure
economic loss among contracting parties,40 the rule does not bar tort
claims in cases of near privity.41  As a substantive matter, this result is
troubling.  A formal requirement of contractual privity does not ade-
quately account for the gaps in privity that often occur within a series
of interrelated, complex commercial contracts—like those involved in
data breach cases.42  Even if the tort plaintiff is not in privity with the
defendant, the two parties can still be situated within a web of con-
tracts that permit the plaintiff to adequately protect her interests
through contracting with others.  By relying on this type of substantive
rationale, many courts have applied the contractually based economic
loss rule to bar tort recovery for identity theft in cases of near privity,
contrary to the formal or black-letter version of the economic loss
rule.43
The formal version of the economic loss rule is also subject to va-
ried exceptions,44  leaving open the question of whether there is a
more general substantive formulation that captures the relevant con-
siderations across the full range of cases.  Why does the rule bar tort
recovery for pure economic loss in some cases but not others?  The
question can be resolved only by a substantive conception of the eco-
nomic loss rule, not by a conception that is based wholly on the formal
properties of the tort claim: Does it seek to allocate responsibility for
pure economic loss among contracting parties?
B. The Substantive Contracting Rationale for the
Economic Loss Rule
According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the contractually
based economic loss rule “origin[ated] in cases that involve[d] prod-
ucts liability.”45  In product cases, a growing majority of courts have
followed the approach charted by the U.S. Supreme Court in East
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST.
2012).
41. Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 286–87 (D. Me. 2005).
42. See id. at 287 (“[T]he credit card industry involves a complex web of relationships involv-
ing numerous players governed by both individual contracts and exhaustive regulations promul-
gated by Visa and other card networks.”).
43. See Annett Holdings, Inc. v. Kum & Go, L.C., 801 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Iowa 2011) (“When
parties enter into a chain of contracts, even if the two parties at issue have not actually entered
into an agreement with each other, courts have applied the ‘contractual economic loss rule’ to
bar tort claims for economic loss, on the theory that tort law should not supplant a consensual
network of contracts.”).  These cases are discussed at greater length in Sharkey, supra note 37. R
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3.
45. Id. § 3 cmt. a.
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River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delavel Inc.,46  which barred
tort recovery for all stand-alone economic harms to ensure that con-
tract law does not “drown in a sea of tort.”47  As the Court explained,
“damage to a product itself has certain attributes of a products-liabil-
ity claim.  But the injury suffered—the failure of the product to func-
tion properly—is the essence of a warranty action through which a
contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain.”48  This
contracting rationale has been regularly invoked by other courts,
yielding a “high degree of agreement” that the economic loss rule bars
tort recovery for pure economic loss in order to maintain the bound-
ary between contract and tort law.49  The Restatement then “general-
izes” this rule so that it also bars tort claims for “economic injuries
arising from the breach of other sorts of contracts.”50
Although courts regularly limit the tort duty for these reasons, they
have not rigorously analyzed or systematically developed the substan-
tive contracting rationale for doing so.  In a 2016 article written for the
21st Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Policy, I showed
that when the economic loss rule is justified by a substantive con-
tracting rationale, the availability of tort recovery for pure economic
losses depends on whether the ordinary consumer has the requisite
information to protect the relevant set of interests by contracting.51
This formulation justifies the general bar to recovery of pure eco-
nomic loss in product cases as per the black-letter rule, but it also
improves the rule by justifying the limited exceptions that have other-
wise eluded satisfactory explanation in the case law.52
The logic of the substantive contracting rationale for the economic
loss rule is evident in the Restatement.53  For example, the Restatement
permits tort recovery for pure economic loss in cases involving the
46. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
47. Id. at 865–66.
48. Id. at 867–68.
49. Johnson, supra note 33, at 526. R
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2012).
51. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Contractually Based Economic Loss Rule in Tort Law: Endan-
gered Consumers and the Error of East River Steamship, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 393 (2016) [herein-
after Economic Loss Rule].
52. See id. at 401–16 (showing how the substantive contracting rationale explains why courts
permit tort recovery for pure economic loss in cases of asbestos abatement and medical monitor-
ing—two important exceptions to the economic loss rule in product cases that courts have not
otherwise squared with that rule).
53. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 3 cmt. c
(“[T]he purpose of this Section is to protect the bargain the parties made, not to penalize the
plaintiff for failing to make a broader one.  Navigating between these points may require study
of the transaction and its logic.”).
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negligent provision of professional services, recognizing that the ex-
ception critically depends on the criteria for determining whether the
defendant supplied professional services:
In defining which occupational groups are “professionals,” courts
consider whether the practice of the occupation requires formal
training and a license issued by a public body, whether the occupa-
tion has an internal code of conduct and discipline, and whether
there is a need for complex discretionary judgments in carrying out
the work. These are proxies for the policies that lie behind the rule of
this Section [permitting tort recovery for pure economic loss caused
by the negligent provision of professional services]; they suggest lim-
its on the reliability of contract to effectively regulate the risks at
stake. Thus, licensing requirements demonstrate that the community
expects due care of the practitioner apart from the duties imposed
by contract. Requirements of formal training for the work mean
that a client is not likely to understand the practitioner’s methods
well enough to negotiate over their use. Internal rules of conduct
elicit an extra measure of trust from clients and suggest that the
occupational group itself regards contract alone as an inadequate
device for setting standards. And if the practitioner’s work requires
complex discretionary judgments, it will be hard to specify how they
should be made. The client cannot simply make a contract for a
particular result and then sue for breach if the result is not
obtained.54
As these comments show, the ordinary client who does business
with a “professional” does not have sufficient information to protect
his or her economic interests by contracting over the “complex discre-
tionary judgment in carrying out the work.”  The substantive con-
tracting rationale for the economic loss rule does not apply, justifying
an independent tort duty requiring the professional to exercise rea-
sonable care in providing these services.
Whether the economic loss rule applies in any given case, therefore,
does not solely depend on the formal properties of the parties’ rela-
tionship and the damages claim.  When justified by a substantive con-
tracting rationale, the economic loss rule only eliminates the tort duty
if the ordinary patient, client, or other type of customer has the infor-
mation required to adequately protect her interests by contracting.
C. The Substantive Contracting Rationale in Data Breach Cases
Whether the substantive version of the economic loss rule applies in
data breach cases depends on whether the ordinary customer has suf-
ficient information to protect his or her confidential information by
contracting with a business over the reasonable security of that data.
54. Id. § 4 cmt. b (emphasis added).
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The issue is complex and outside the informed contracting capabilities
of most customers.  Due to the inadequacy of contracting, an indepen-
dent tort obligation is required to ensure that businesses adopt rea-
sonable measures for protecting confidential customer information.55
Consider a computer network utilized by a business.  How is a cus-
tomer supposed to evaluate the risk or degree to which the network is
vulnerable to hacking and other types of cyberbreaches?  The cus-
tomer can assess the value of the confidential data in question, but
that is not enough.  The customer must also assess the software that
protects the business’s database from unauthorized access.  “[T]he
ability of most consumers to obtain information about code is limited
and the information is not readily available,” and so the ordinary cus-
tomer usually cannot “assess the risks of the data plus code
combination.”56
Not only are customers unable to accurately assess the risk that
their confidential information will be stolen from the business, but
given the complexity of the assessment, they could easily forego con-
sideration of the matter altogether, reasoning that the cost of evaluat-
ing a business’s security measures vastly outweighs any potential
benefits.57  Moreover, customers repeatedly face the same problem as
55. For extended analysis showing why uninformed consumer contracting decisions result in
contracts that do not adequately protect consumer interests, see Geistfeld, Economic Loss Rule,
supra note 51, at 397–401; Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, the Hacker Way, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. R
1, 46 (2013) (“In consumer privacy contexts, commercially reasonable negotiated measures of
information care and security are absent.  Due to their non-negotiability, terms of use and pri-
vacy policies reflect an imbalance in favor of the drafter—the data aggregator—whose interests
are not aligned with those of the consumer.”).
56. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of
Code Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital Products, 62 FL. L. REV. 109, 120 (2010) (footnote
omitted).
57. To be sure, some customers may have sufficient expertise or otherwise be willing to incur
the costs of becoming informed about the data security measures adopted by a business.  If
enough customers are well informed, the business would have a sufficient financial incentive to
provide reasonable data protection.  This dynamic, however, actually exacerbates the informa-
tional problem and substantially strengthens the case for the tort duty, because the conduct of
well-informed customers creates an information externality that benefits uninformed customers.
As I have explained in a related context involving product safety,
[t]his informational externality . . . reduces consumer incentives to acquire costly infor-
mation in the first instance.  When information is costly to acquire and process, any
consumer may rationally decide to free ride on the informed choices of others, thereby
saving the information costs.  The consumer can get the benefits of information (safe
products) without incurring the costs of acquiring and processing the information.  Rea-
soning similarly, other consumers will make the same choice.  The free-rider problem
may result in no consumer incurring the costs necessary for making informed decisions
about product safety.
Mark A. Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 295
(Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009) (citations omitted).  By this same reasoning, each individual
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they engage in myriad transactions with other businesses, often over
the course of a single day.  Who has the time, energy, and capacity to
make an informed contractual decision over data security with each
and every transacting party?
Recognizing the informational problem, the ordinary customer
would instead want to contractually obligate the business to adopt
reasonable security measures. The solution to the contracting problem
is no different from an independent tort duty requiring the business to
exercise reasonable care.
Like the tort duty governing the provision of professional services,
the tort duty obligating businesses to protect confidential consumer
information can be derived from a substantive contracting rationale.
The contracting problem over the provision of professional services is
not obviously any easier to solve than the contracting problem over
data theft.58  Each one is complex and outside the competence of the
ordinary client or customer.  As in the case of professional malprac-
tice, the contracting problem for identify theft is better resolved by an
independent tort duty requiring the exercise of reasonable care.
The independent tort duty obligating businesses to protect confi-
dential consumer information finds further justification in public pol-
icy.  In justifying the tort duty encompassing the pure economic losses
caused by the negligent provision of professional services, the Restate-
ment observes that “licensing requirements demonstrate that the com-
munity expects due care of the practitioner apart from the duties
imposed by contract.”59  So, too, the public policy embodied in nu-
merous statutes and regulations fully justifies a tort duty for busi-
nesses to protect confidential consumer data that is independent of
any contractual obligation.
“[S]everal states have enacted laws imposing a general obligation
on all companies to ensure the security of personal information,”60
including California.61  The statutory requirements also involve the
customer can rationally decide not to become informed about the data security of a particular
business, creating the informational problem that justifies the tort duty.
58. As the Restatement explains with respect to the provision of professional services: “if the
practitioner’s work requires complex discretionary judgments, it will be hard to specify how they
should be made.  The client cannot simply make a contract for a particular result and then sue
for breach if the result is not obtained.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECO-
NOMIC HARM § 4 cmt. b.
59. Id.
60. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, An Overview of Data Security Legal Requirements for All Busi-
ness Sectors 5 (Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2671323.
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 1016).
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obligation to disclose security breaches to the affected parties.62  In
addition, “[t]he obligation to provide adequate security for personal
data collected, used, and/or maintained by a business is a critical com-
ponent of almost all privacy laws.  Most statements of basic privacy
principles include security as a key component.”63  These obliga-
tions—to take reasonable security measures and to disclose any secur-
ity breaches—are each implied by the contractual transaction between
a business and its customers.64  The obligations are contractual in the
first instance, yet legislatures have also made them into independent
legal obligations, thereby preventing businesses from disowning these
responsibilities with contractual disclaimers and the like.  These legis-
lative requirements accordingly “demonstrate that the community ex-
pects due care of the [business to protect confidential consumer
information] apart from the duties imposed by contract,”65 the same
rationale for subjecting the providers of professional services to a tort
duty that is independent of their contractual obligations.
To be sure, these statutes do not create a tort cause of action for
identity theft, but they still justify the common-law duty.  For reasons
of institutional comity, courts exercise common-law discretion by de-
ferring to a nonbinding legislative policy determination that is rele-
vant to the resolution of a tort claim.66  Pursuant to this principle of
deference, if a statute or administrative regulation is based on a policy
decision that is relevant to any issue posed by the common-law duty
question, courts will defer to that policy decision.  Consequently, if a
regulation or statute resolves a policy issue that courts had previously
relied upon to reject the duty, then deference to this particular legisla-
tive policy determination would enable courts to recognize a new
duty.67  In this respect, a state regulation or statute can justify a new
common-law tort duty, even if there is no statutory purpose to create
a new form of tort liability.68
62. Smedinghoff, supra note 60, at 6 (“A total of 46 states in the U.S., plus the District of R
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, have enacted security breach notification laws
. . . .”).
63. Id. at 5.
64. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. R
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM § 4 cmt. b (AM. LAW
INST. 2012).
66. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 IOWA L. REV. 957, 976–83
(2014) [hereinafter Age of Statutes].
67. See id. at 977–83.
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 14 cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that the violation of a statute is relevant to duty
analysis and can lead courts to recognize a duty that they would not otherwise recognize absent
the statute).
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When courts invoke the contractually based economic loss rule to
bar tort recovery for identity theft, their decisions are based on the
policy judgment that customers can adequately protect their interests
by contracting.69  The identical policy issue is addressed by regulations
and statutes that require businesses to adequately protect confidential
customer information.  As these regulations and statutes clearly show,
legislatures have concluded that contracting does not sufficiently pro-
tect against data theft.  By deferring to this legislative policy judg-
ment, courts can conclude that the substantive contracting rationale
for negating the tort duty with the economic loss rule does not apply
in cases of identity theft.70
More generally, one can persuasively argue that the law of fiduciary
relationships can be defensibly extended to recognize a new category
of “information fiduciaries.”71  For present purposes, however, the ar-
gument is more straightforward.  Identity theft involves an issue of
public policy that is not adequately addressed by the private ordering
of contracts—the domain protected by the economic loss rule.  In the
Information Age, the integrity of the marketplace depends on the ad-
equate protection of the confidential consumer information that has
become a necessary component of business transactions.72  Instead of
exclusively relying on contracts to address this important issue, federal
and state legislation has sought to bolster the integrity of the market
by making data security an independent obligation owed by busi-
nesses to their customers.  By recognizing this public policy, courts can
justify a common-law duty for businesses to exercise reasonable care
in the protection of confidential customer information.  Public policy
ultimately supplies the strongest argument for a tort duty not limited
by the economic loss rule in cases of identity theft.73
69. See supra Part II.B.
70. To be sure, the widespread statutory regulation could evince a legislative purpose that
might be undermined by additional tort regulation, but if so, the statutory scheme would pre-
empt the common-law tort claim. See Geistfeld, Age of Statutes, supra note 66, at 1004–09. R
Unless tort claims are expressly or impliedly preempted by the statutes in question, courts can
defer to the underlying legislative policy judgment that cases of identity theft are not adequately
regulated by the private ordering of contracts, justifying a tort duty for reasons given in the text
above.
71. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1183, 1205–09 (2016). But see Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 157–58 (1st
Cir. 2011) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that defendant retailer owed them a fiduciary duty to pro-
tect their credit and debit card data).
72. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. R
73. Indeed, the integrity of the market provides a rationale for another important exception to
the economic loss rule. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC HARM
§ 3 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (“Fraudulent inducement to enter a contract, unlike a claim of
negligent misrepresentation, can in some circumstances give a plaintiff a viable tort claim.  When
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III. NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY?
A tort duty to exercise reasonable care directly translates into the
rule of negligence liability, but it can also justify a rule of strict liabil-
ity.  As before, the tort rules governing liability for defective products
provide relevant guidance.
Strict products liability is a body of law that contains important
rules of negligence liability—most notably, the risk-utility test for de-
termining whether a product has a defective design or warning—but
strict liability applies to products that malfunction, often due to con-
struction or manufacturing defects.74  The varied rules of negligence
and strict liability are rendered into a coherent body of law by the
manner in which the duty to exercise reasonable care justifies the lim-
ited rules of strict liability.75  The same reasoning applies to cases of
identity theft.
In order to effectuate the transaction, a business impliedly repre-
sents that it will exercise reasonable care in the protection of a cus-
tomer’s confidential data.76  Based on this implied representation, one
court rejected a claim for strict liability:
A jury could reasonably find that customers would not tender cards
to merchants who undertook zero obligation to protect customers’
electronic data. But in today’s known world of sophisticated hack-
ers, data theft, software glitches, and computer viruses, a jury could
not reasonably find an implied merchant commitment against every
intrusion under any circumstances whatsoever (consider, for exam-
ple, an armed robber confronting the merchant’s computer systems
personnel at gunpoint).  Thus, . . . a jury could not reasonably find
that an unqualified guaranty of confidentiality by the merchant is
“absolutely essential” to the contract for a sale of groceries (there is
two parties negotiate over a contract, the amount of care they are expected to show for each
other’s interests will often be unclear or significantly less than the care expected in a situation
involving strangers or the risk of physical injury.  That is among the reasons why the duties of
care between parties who negotiate contracts are not governed by the law of tort.  Expectations
of honesty are more regular, however, and the disappointment of them may call for remedies not
customarily available from the law of contract or restitution.  Liability in tort may therefore be
recognized in such circumstances.”); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS
§ 41.9 (2d ed. 2016) (arguing that “the existence of a contract duty does not preclude construc-
tion of a tort duty where considerations of justice and policy warrant liability” and concluding
that this “is true even in pure economic loss cases, as the attorney example [of legal malpractice]
shows”).
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 2–3 (AM. LAW INST.
1997).
75. See generally MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 45–61 (2012) (showing how
courts defensibly relied on the tort duty of reasonable care to justify the rule of strict liability for
malfunctioning products).
76. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. R
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no reason to believe that consumers would cease using their cards in
the absence of a 100% guaranty of data safety).77
The problem with this reasoning is that it applies with equal force to
the realm of product quality, and yet defects that cause a product to
malfunction are subject to strict liability.  To see why, consider the
paradigmatic case of a soda bottle that explodes and causes injury to
the consumer—the fact pattern that spawned the modern rule of strict
products liability along with the contaminated food cases.78
Why does the exploding soda bottle frustrate consumer expecta-
tions, subjecting the seller to strict liability?  Consumers know that
perfect quality control is prohibitively expensive if not impossible.
Despite the best inspection or manufacturing procedures, some defec-
tive soda bottles (and some contaminated food) will be distributed in
the market.  The risk of defect is unavoidable.  Instead of expecting
perfection, the ordinary consumer only expects that the soda bottle
(or food) has passed reasonably safe, though imperfect, tests of qual-
ity control.  For an exploding soda bottle to frustrate consumer expec-
tations, the product performance must be attributable to the
manufacturer’s failure to exercise reasonable care in quality control.
Consumer expectations accordingly justify a tort rule no different
from ordinary negligence liability for the same reasons that the
equivalent expectation of reasonably safe design justifies the negli-
gence-based, risk-utility test.79  What, then, justifies the rule of strict
liability for the exploding soda bottle?
The rationale for strict liability is based on the difficulty of ade-
quately enforcing the manufacturer’s obligation to adopt reasonable
quality-control measures.  What is the full range of reasonably safe
measures that a manufacturer could adopt to ensure the quality of a
mass-manufactured product like bottled soda?  The various measures
are either complex (the incorporation of quality-control systems into
the manufacturing process) or often cannot be proven with reliable
evidence (as with visual inspection by employees).  The expectation of
77. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119 (D.
Me. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir.
2011) (holding that the relationship between a grocer and customer is not a confidential
relationship).
78. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., the concurrence by Justice Traynor argued for the
rule of strict liability that was ultimately widely adopted by other courts.  150 P.2d 436, 461 (Cal.
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.: Strict
Products Liability Unbound, in TORTS STORIES 229, 234–39 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 2003).
79. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 37–43 (2d ed. 2011) (ex-
plaining why the ordinary consumer reasonably expects manufacturers to make cost-effective
safety investments).
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reasonable quality control, therefore, generates important safety obli-
gations that cannot be adequately enforced by the consumer.80  A
manufacturer that does not take such a required precaution will avoid
negligence liability,81 impairing its financial incentives to incur this
costly safety investment in quality control.  Due to the cost and diffi-
culty of enforcement, the negligence rule does not adequately protect
the consumer’s expectation that the manufacturer will employ reason-
able quality-control measures.
To solve this evidentiary problem and thereby enforce the expecta-
tion of reasonable quality control, the ordinary consumer can reasona-
bly expect the manufacturer to guarantee that the soda bottle will not
explode or is otherwise fit for its intended purpose—a rule of strict
liability.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes explained, “the safest way to se-
cure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what pre-
cautions shall be taken.”82  Once a manufacturer becomes strictly
liable for injuries caused by a defective product, the court no longer
needs to rely on the plaintiff’s proof to evaluate the manufacturer’s
safety decisions.  Strict liability “throws” that decision on the manu-
facturer, restoring its financial incentive to exercise reasonable care.
In deciding how to proceed, a manufacturer subject to strict liability
will rationally try to minimize its total costs.  The manufacturer under-
stands that it will be liable for the compensable injuries suffered by
consumers.  These liability costs depend upon the probability that an
injury will occur (denoted P) and the total amount of damages or loss
caused by the injury (denoted L).  Multiplying these two factors to-
gether yields the manufacturer’s expected liability costs (PL).  The
manufacturer can reduce the expected liability costs by improving
safety and decreasing the likelihood of product-caused injury.  Ordi-
narily, such a safety precaution imposes a cost or burden on the manu-
facturer (denoted B).  A strictly liable manufacturer, therefore, will
rationally compare the burden (B) of a safety precaution to the ex-
pected liability costs that it would otherwise incur by not taking the
precaution and eliminating this risk (PL).  To minimize costs, the
80. See Escola, 150 P.2d at 439.
81. As one court observed:
It is not doubted that due care might require the defendant to adopt some device that
would afford [reasonable] protection against [the injury suffered by plaintiff.]  Such a
device, if it exists, is not disclosed by the record.  The burden was upon the plaintiff to
show its practicability.  Since the burden was not sustained, a verdict should have been
directed for the defendant.
Cooley v. Pub. Serv. Co., 10 A.2d 673, 677 (N.H. 1940).
82. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 117 (1881).
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manufacturer will take any precaution costing less than the expected
liability costs it would otherwise incur:
B < PL
Now consider the precautions required by the negligence standard
of reasonable care.  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the standard of reasonable care requires a determination of “whether
the magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law attaches
to the conduct which involves it.”83  One form of this determination is
captured by Judge Learned Hand’s well-known formulation of the
negligence standard: “if the probability [of injury] be called P; the in-
jury, L; and the burden [of a precaution that would eliminate this risk]
B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e.,
whether B < PL.”84  This standard of reasonable care not only satisfies
the ordinary consumer’s reasonable expectations of product safety, it
also requires the same safety precautions that would be chosen by a
strictly liable manufacturer.
Insofar as the manufacturer would have foregone any of these
safety investments in a negligence regime due to problems of proof,
the shift to strict liability will increase manufacturer investments in
product safety and reduce product risk.85  The evidentiary difficulties
inherent in negligence liability, therefore, can justify strict liability as a
means for enforcing the duty to exercise reasonable care.
Modern courts invoked this reasoning to justify the ancient rule of
strict liability for the sale of contaminated food.86  These cases subse-
quently influenced others, like those involving exploding bottles of
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
84. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (emphasis added).
85. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3, 23 (1980)
(showing how strict liability can reduce risk by reducing “activity” levels, where “activity” is any
aspect of risky behavior that is outside the ambit of negligence liability due to evidentiary
limitations).
86. In tort cases involving the sale of contaminated food, as the Texas Supreme Court ob-
served, “a rule which would require proof of negligence as a basis of recovery would, in most
instances, by reason of the difficulty of making such proof, be equivalent to a denial of recov-
ery.”  Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. 1942).  After discussing the
difficulties faced by a plaintiff in trying to prove that a defendant failed to exercise reasonable
care in distributing contaminated food, the court concluded that these evidentiary difficulties
justified a rule of strict liability:
Such a rule would seem to be more desirable because it permits the placing of the
ultimate loss upon the manufacturer, who is in the best position to prevent the produc-
tion and sale of unwholesome food.  It stimulates and induces a greater degree of pre-
caution for the protection of human life and health than does the rule of ordinary care.
Id.
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soda.87  This case law was then restated into the rule of strict products
liability.88  As the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains, strict liability
applies to manufacturing defects—the reason why the food was con-
taminated or the soda bottle exploded—because the liability serves an
“instrumental function of creating safety incentives” greater than
those in a negligence regime, “under which, as a practical matter, sell-
ers may escape their appropriate share of liability.”89
This evidentiary rationale for strict liability has long been recog-
nized by courts in other types of cases.  According to a nineteenth
century torts treatise, “the ground on which a rule of strict obligation
has been maintained and consolidated by modern authorities is the
magnitude of danger, coupled with the difficulty of proving negligence
as the specific cause, in the particular event of the danger having rip-
ened into actual harm.”90  This reasoning, for example, can justify the
rule of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.91  Indeed,
the evidentiary rationale for strict liability provided an important jus-
tification for the statutory schemes of workers’ compensation that
were widely adopted by the states in the early 1900s.92
87. As Justice Traynor observed in his influential concurrence arguing for strict products lia-
bility, a negligence regime does not adequately solve the safety problem, because “[a]n injured
person . . . is not ordinarily in a position to refute [the manufacturer’s evidence of reasonable
care] or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be family with the manufacturing
process as the manufacturer himself is.”  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. b (discussing how the rule of strict
products liability evolved from the sale of contaminated or “corrupt” food and drink).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
90. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGA-
TIONS ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMON LAW 307 (1st ed. 1887).
91. See Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990).
For more extensive discussion, see Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule
of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1998).  For ex-
tended argument that the logic of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities applies to
cases of identity theft, see Citron, supra note 3.  That rule, however, does not apply in contrac- R
tual settings. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 24(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that an otherwise abnormally dangerous activity is
not subject to strict liability if “the person suffers physical or emotional harm as a result of
making contact with or coming into proximity to the defendant’s . . . abnormally dangerous
activity for the purpose of securing some benefit from that contact or that proximity” (emphasis
added)).  In contractual settings, the plaintiff comes into “contact” with the defendant’s activity
of supplying the service or product in question in order to derive the benefit from that service or
transaction, barring application of strict liability on the ground that it is an abnormally danger-
ous activity. See id. § 24 cmt. a (explaining why strict liability does not govern claims made by
airline passengers for plane crashes, or “if at the plaintiff’s request the defendant blasts on the
plaintiff’s land, or if the defendant treats the plaintiff’s home with an insecticide”).
92. According to the U.S. Supreme Court:
In support of the legislation, it is said that the whole common-law doctrine of em-
ployer’s liability for negligence, with its defenses of contributory negligence, fellow ser-
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The same rationale for strict liability applies to the tort duty requir-
ing businesses to exercise reasonable care for protecting confidential
consumer information.  Complicated computer programs protect busi-
nesses from unauthorized access to their computer systems.  The sys-
tem itself involves six different elements, each of which makes the
system vulnerable to unauthorized access.93  Given the complex inter-
relationships, how can the ordinary consumer prove that the business
did not have a reasonably secure system?  Moreover, “[c]yber-intrud-
ers employ increasingly innovative techniques to bypass security mea-
sures and steal personal data, thereby requiring an ever-changing
information-security response to new threats, vulnerabilities, and
technologies.”94  Measures that were once reasonable can quickly be-
come outdated, eliminating the efficacy of custom as a measure of rea-
sonable care—a suspect form of proof in any event.95  Plaintiffs who
were victims of identity theft would have to prove what reasonable
care requires within a technologically complex and constantly evolv-
ing environment, an evidentiary burden comparable to, if not greater
than, the burden faced by a consumer trying to prove that a product
manufacturer failed to adopt reasonable quality-control measures.
Data breaches can also occur due to lapses by the employees of a
business, but that same behavior can result in defective products (as in
the preparation of contaminated food).  The proof in these cases is not
difficult because of the complexity of the safety decision, but rather
because it typically depends on testimony by the employees.  Were the
proper procedures followed?  Was attention being paid?  The unrelia-
ble nature of this proof can also justify a rule of strict liability.
vant’s negligence, and assumption of risk, is based upon fictions, and is inapplicable to
modern conditions of employment; that in the highly organized and hazardous indus-
tries of the present day the causes of accident are often so obscure and complex that in
a material proportion of cases it is impossible by any method correctly to ascertain the
facts necessary to form an accurate judgment, and in a still larger proportion the ex-
pense and delay required for such ascertainment amount in effect to a defeat of justice;
that, under the present system, the injured workman is left to bear the greater part of
industrial accident loss, which because of his limited income, he is unable to sustain, so
that he and those dependent upon him are overcome by poverty and frequently be-
come a burden upon public or private charity; and that litigation is unduly costly and
tedious, encouraging corrupt practices and arousing antagonisms between employers
and employees.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 197 (1917).
93. See Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction, supra note 56, at 115–18. R
94. Citron, supra note 3, at 264 (footnotes omitted). R
95. See GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 79, at 112–14 (explaining R
why courts have rejected customary safety practices as proof of reasonable care in product
cases).
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For example, courts relied on this reasoning to justify the early com-
mon-law rule that subjected common carriers, like railroads, to strict
liability for losing the baggage of customers.  As one court explained,
What is the reason that the common law will not excuse the carrier
unless he show the act of God, or the enemies of the Republic, or
the misconduct of the plaintiff? . . . As late as 1828, in Riley v.
Horne, Best, Ch. J., said: “If the goods should be lost or injured by
the grossest negligence of the carrier or his servants, or stolen by
them or by thieves in collusion with them, the owner would be una-
ble to prove either of these causes of loss: his witnesses must be the
carrier’s servants, and they, knowing that they could not be contra-
dicted, would excuse their masters and themselves.”96
Once again, this reasoning also applies to identify theft.  Whether
the property (luggage or personal data) is supposed to be secured by a
common carrier or a retailer, an employee’s failure to protect that
property poses the same evidentiary problems.  How often could a
plaintiff credibly prove that the employee was at fault?  After all, “his
witnesses must be the [business’s] servants, and they, knowing that
they could not be contradicted, would excuse their masters and them-
selves.”97  Rather than rely on an employee’s unreliable testimony,
courts can instead impose strict liability on the business responsible
for the identity theft.
To be sure, negligence can be easy to prove in some cases.  For ex-
ample, the defendants in two recent high-profile cases of identity theft
presumably acted negligently by disregarding internal protocols or in-
dustry standards.98  The issue, however, is not whether proof of negli-
gence is easy in some cases.  The true question is whether identity
theft is likely to involve difficulties of proving negligence across the
entire category of cases.  The evolving complexity of the problem and
the associated technological responses make it exceedingly difficult to
adequately regulate this category of cases with negligence liability,
justifying a rule of strict liability.
Like the element of duty, the substantive standard of strict liability
ultimately finds its strongest support in the important public policy of
maintaining the integrity of markets.  The integrity of product markets
critically depends on the ability of consumers to rely on product qual-
ity, a concern that first found expression in the ancient rule imposing
96. Cole v. Goodwin & Story, 19 Wend. 250, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (citations omitted).
97. Id.
98. See Robert L. Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security and Tort Law, 66 DEPAUL L.
REV. 313, 315–16 (2017) (discussing security lapses by the retailer Target and the U.S. Govern-
ment resulting in widespread identity theft).
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strict liability on the sale of contaminated food.99  In the same way
that the logic of this rule fostered the development of strict products
liability, it also justifies a rule of strict liability for protecting the confi-
dential information that customers entrust to others in business trans-
actions.  In both instances, the protection afforded by negligence
liability is inadequate due to difficulties of proof, requiring a rule of
strict liability to enforce those obligations that are necessary for main-
taining the integrity of the marketplace.
IV. DAMAGES
Identity theft can cause a variety of harms, as illustrated by the
damages sought by class members in Anderson v. Hannaford Brothers
Co.,100 which included the cost of credit-monitoring services, unautho-
rized third-party credit-card charges that had been reversed by the
issuing bank, various fees, lost reward points, “emotional distress, and
time and effort spent reversing unauthorized charges and protecting
against further fraud.”101  After concluding that the economic loss rule
is limited to product cases and does not bar negligence claims for
identity theft,102 the district court dismissed these claims for each
plaintiff (except one) on the ground that the damages were not cogni-
zable under Maine’s governing state law.103  As this ruling shows, even
if identity theft victims survive the bar posed by the economic loss
rule, they still face considerable difficulties once the analysis turns to
the element of damages.
First, consider the question of whether the plaintiff must actually
incur unauthorized charges to her credit card in order to recover.  In
Hannaford Brothers, the federal appellate court held that the theft of
a plaintiff’s confidential information makes it reasonable to monitor
her credit reports for fraudulent activity, justifying tort recovery for
this expense of mitigating the loss.104  The court’s holding was based
on the doctrine of avoidable consequences (discussed below), which
further illustrates why the tort duty permits recovery for certain types
99. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
100. 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 2011)
101. Id. at 155.
102. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108, 126–28
(D. Me. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Anderson, 659 F.3d at 151 (holding that grocery store
customers had a cognizable injury through identity theft, as required for a cause of action for
negligence and breach of contract against a grocer).
103. Id. at 131–35.  The only remaining plaintiff sought damages for the financial loss of fraud-
ulent charges that were not subsequently reimbursed by the bank that had issued the credit card.
Id. at 133.
104. Hannaford Bros., 659 F.3d at 163–64.
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of pure economic loss.  For example, one who faces a risk of cancer
due to the defendant’s tortious conduct can recover for the reasonable
costs of medical monitoring, regardless of whether she ultimately gets
cancer.105  The same principle of mitigating future harms applies to
the recovery of the fees for credit-monitoring services.  To recover for
the reasonable costs of purchasing credit-monitoring services, a plain-
tiff need not actually incur the costs of unauthorized transactions.
As in Hannaford Brothers, those identity theft victims who incur
unauthorized charges to their credit cards or bank accounts often do
not have to pay for them, as these charges are routinely reversed or
the losses otherwise reimbursed by the financial institution in ques-
tion.106  Nevertheless, the unauthorized charge can still constitute a
compensable form of economic loss for these victims.  A bank that
reimburses a plaintiff for unauthorized charges would have a subroga-
tion right to any tort damages that the plaintiff receives for the loss.107
The subrogation action makes the bank whole, ensures that the plain-
tiff is not doubly compensated for the identity theft, and places the
ultimate loss on the party responsible for the loss in the first in-
stance—the business that enabled a third party to steal the plaintiff’s
confidential information.108  The reimbursement of unauthorized
charges by a third party should not foreclose the victim of identity
theft from recovering tort damages for those charges.
A more difficult issue involves damage claims for the time and ef-
fort to reverse unauthorized charges and protect against further fraud.
In Hannaford Brothers, plaintiffs based their claim for recovery of
these costs on the doctrine of avoidable consequences or mitigation of
damages.109  A clear statement of this doctrine is provided by the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts: “One whose legally protected interests
have been endangered by the tortious conduct of another is entitled to
recover for expenditures reasonably made . . . to avert the harm
threatened.”110  To determine whether this doctrine permitted plain-
105. Recovery for these claims is permitted in about one-half of the jurisdictions that have
addressed the matter. See Geistfeld, Economic Loss Rule, supra note 51, at 419–22.  The courts R
that have rejected these claims, however, do not invoke the economic loss rule but instead rely
on concerns such as fraud and administrability that are not relevant for present purposes. See id.
(arguing that medical monitoring is an important exception to the economic loss rule).
106. See, e.g., Banknorth, N.A. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 (D. Me.
2005) (discussing plaintiff bank’s “averment that it reimbursed its customers for all amounts lost
by them as a result of Defendants’ conduct”).
107. See, e.g., id. at 287–88 (discussing doctrine of equitable subrogation).
108. Id.
109. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 4 A.3d 492, 496–97 (Me.
2010).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 919(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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tiffs to recover for their lost time and effort, the federal district court
in Hannaford Brothers certified the question to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, which concluded that the damages are not recover-
able under Maine law: “Unless the plaintiffs’ loss of time reflects a
corresponding loss of earnings or earning opportunities, it is not a cog-
nizable injury under Maine law of negligence.”111
The court justified this conclusion in part on the ground that tort
law does not permit recovery for “an inconvenience or annoyance,”112
but its primary rationale was based on the difficulty of measuring the
loss.113  Recognizing that courts in other jurisdictions have permitted
recovery for time and effort independent of lost earnings or earning
capacity, the court concluded that these cases had “little bearing on
[its] analysis” because “a passing mention of loss of time without ade-
quate facts to demonstrate how those damages were being measured
is insufficient to persuade us that the expenditure of time and effort
alone is a harm recoverable in negligence.”114
The threshold question posed by this ruling is whether tort damages
are available for “an inconvenience or annoyance.”115  The general
bar to tort recovery for this type of harm is most clearly embodied in
the “live and let live” principle of nuisance law: “[P]eople who live in
organized communities must of necessity suffer some inconvenience
and annoyance from their neighbors and must submit to annoyances
consequent upon the reasonable use of property by others.”116  The
emphasis on “reasonable” is in the original quote and applies with full
force to the issue under present consideration, which involves a claim
of strict liability for identity theft.  A strictly liable defendant has pre-
sumptively acted reasonably unless the evidence shows otherwise (in
which case the plaintiff recovers under negligence).  Absent such evi-
dence, the defendant for legal purposes has acted reasonably, preclud-
ing an identity theft victim from recovering for mere annoyance and
inconvenience.
Any identity theft victim will spend time getting new credit cards
and the like, but for many of these individuals, only a few hours are
required.  For example, a DOJ study found that half of all identity
111. In re Hannaford Bros., 4 A.3d at 492, 497.
112. Id. at 497.
113. Id. at 496 (observing that a plaintiff can receive tort damages for lost time when it results
in a loss of earnings or earnings capacity, but “the time in question [can] be assigned a value
reflecting” these losses).
114. Id. at 497.
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. R
116. O’Cain v. O’Cain, 473 S.E.2d 460, 466 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996).  The rule was famously ex-
pressed in Baron Bramwell’s opinion in Bamford v. Turnley [1862] 122 Eng. Rep. 127 (Ex.).
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theft victims in 2014 spent a day or less to address the problem.117  For
these victims, the lost time is an inconvenience or annoyance that is
not compensable in tort.
As previously discussed, however, some victims of identity theft suf-
fer a substantial loss of time.  According to the DOJ study, “about
9%” of victims who were able to resolve the financial and credit
problems caused by the identity theft in 2014 “spent more than a
month” doing so.118  This is hardly a mere annoyance or
inconvenience.
For this class of plaintiffs, the amount of damages for lost time de-
pends on how they frame the damages claim.  In the Hannaford
Brothers case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that lost time
is a compensable economic harm only if it corresponds to an ascer-
tainable market value.119  The time in question involves efforts to cor-
rect unauthorized charges, establish new accounts, and clear the
victim’s credit record.  All of these services are supplied by commer-
cial firms that provide insurance to the victims of identity theft.120
The cost that such a firm would charge the plaintiff to rectify her situa-
tion, therefore, would provide the requisite measure of market value
that a plaintiff could rely on to quantify the economic loss for lost time
caused by the identity theft.
Alternatively, these plaintiffs could frame the damages claim as a
form of nonmonetary injury.  In the class of cases under consideration,
each plaintiff was forced to spend considerable time mitigating dam-
ages for which the defendant is responsible.  Insofar as these efforts
are significantly less enjoyable for the plaintiff than the alternative
ways she could have used that time, the plaintiff has suffered a signifi-
cant loss of life’s pleasures—a compensable form of pain and suffer-
ing.121  To be sure, these damages are hard to measure, but that does
not prevent plaintiffs from recovery (as in cases involving bodily in-
jury and the like).  As courts have widely recognized, it would be “a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice” if the uncertainty cre-
ated by the defendant’s tortious misconduct were to bar the plaintiff
117. See HARRELL, supra note 4, at 1. R
118. Id. at 10.
119. In re Hannaford Bros., 4 A.3d at 496–97.
120. See Identity Theft Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org/article/identity-theft-in-
surance (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) (“Some companies . . . offer restoration or resolution services
that will guide you through the process of recovering your identity.”).
121. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 73, § 34.1 (“Any form of unpleasant emotional reactions to R
the injury or its consequences, so long as it is proximately related to the tort, can be a basis for
the pain and suffering recovery.”).
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from recovering damages.122  To avoid this injustice, tort law reduces
the plaintiff’s burden of proof in the damages phase of the case.  The
plaintiff is only required to establish the amount of damages with “as
much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances per-
mit.”123  The difficulty of measuring the noneconomic injury of lost
time, therefore, does not necessarily foreclose identity theft victims
from recovering damages for the associated loss of life’s pleasures.
The more difficult question is whether any damages for
noneconomic harms should be available in cases of identity theft.
Courts “remain deeply concerned to impose limitations” on recovery
for pure emotional distress, with most requiring that “the plaintiff in
fact suffered severe distress.”124  Moreover, there is some case law in
support of the proposition that because damages for emotional harm
“are usually rejected in breach of contract claims,” by analogy, “re-
covery of emotional distress damages . . . for infliction of a purely
financial tort, where there is no physical harm risk or caused, may be
inappropriate.”125
In the context of identity theft, the analogy to contract law is inap-
posite.  Damages for emotional distress are not available under con-
tract law because that type of harm is not a foreseeable consequence
of the breached contract.  Identity theft is different from the breach of
contract in an ordinary commercial transaction.  The relevant analogy
is to insurance law, which enables policyholders to sue in tort and re-
cover compensatory damages for emotional distress proximately
caused by the insurer’s bad-faith breach of the insurance contract.126
The wrongful denial of an insurance claim predictably places the poli-
cyholder in financial stress with the associated anxieties—the same sit-
uation faced by the victim of identity theft.  Emotional distress is a
foreseeable consequence of breaching the duty to protect confidential
consumer information.
Moreover, the emotional distress is proximately caused by an un-
derlying compensable injury—the financial harms already incurred by
the plaintiff and the ongoing need to mitigate those damages moving
forward.  As a matter of basic tort law, a plaintiff can recover for the
foreseeable nonmonetary injuries that were proximately caused by a
predicate compensable harm (as in the ordinary case of nonmonetary
harms proximately caused by a predicate physical harm).  Plaintiffs
122. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
124. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 73, § 29.9. R
125. Id. § 29.1.
126. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 178–79 (Cal. 1967).
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who have already established a right to recover some compensatory
damages, therefore, should be entitled to additional damages for the
nonmonetary injuries involving lost time and the ensuing emotional
distress, but only if these harms are more than a minor annoyance or
inconvenience.
The important forms of damages caused by identity theft—the cost
of credit-monitoring services and the like, unauthorized charges, and
any significant loss of time and emotional distress—are all compensa-
ble as a matter of basic tort principles. Insofar as other types of eco-
nomic loss (like lost reward points) are substantively similar, they are
also compensable. Proof of compensable loss should not preclude
these victims of identity theft from recovering against the defendant
business that enabled a third party to steal their entrusted confidential
information.
V. CONCLUSION
Identity theft does not readily fit into any of the traditional tort
causes of action, explaining why the victims of identity theft have re-
lied on a variety of tort claims to obtain recovery.127  Based on estab-
lished tort principles, customers who have been victimized by identity
theft clearly have a valid claim of negligence liability against a busi-
ness that was responsible for reasonably securing their confidential
data, which in turn can be extended to a rule of strict liability due to
the difficulties of proving negligence.  The elements of this cause of
action are not straightforward and require some justification, but ulti-
mately the tort liability is best understood as a means for maintaining
the integrity of the market.128
Tort liability, however, will not adequately address the pervasive
problem of identity theft.  The foregoing analysis does not consider
the element of causation, which will bar many if not most victims from
tort recovery.  In 2014, according to a DOJ study, only “32% of iden-
tity theft victims knew how the offender obtained their personal infor-
mation.”129  Unless victims are able to identify the business or other
party that enabled the data theft, they will be unable to prove that any
particular defendant caused their losses.  These victims will have no
tort remedy.
127. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. R
128. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (discussing this policy as a rationale for the R
tort duty); supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing this policy as a rationale for R
the rule of strict liability).
129. HARRELL, supra note 4, at 5. R
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Those who are able to identify the enabling party must still establish
compensable damages.  The DOJ study suggests that only 65% of
them will experience some financial harm eligible for tort recovery.130
If so, then only 21% of all identity theft victims will be able to success-
fully pursue the tort cause of action.131  If the tort claims are further
limited to those incurring financial loss of at least $100, the rate drops
to 2%.132  The elements of causation and damages ultimately pose the
greatest obstacle to tort recovery for identity theft.
As these data strongly suggest, subjecting businesses to strict tort
liability will not adequately protect the confidential information that
has been entrusted to them by customers in the course of doing busi-
ness.  At best, tort law can only complement other regulatory efforts
aimed at securing confidential consumer information in order to main-
tain the integrity of market transactions in the Information Age.
130. Approximately 65% of identity theft victims in 2014 reported some financial loss. Id. at
6.  The 65% rate only applies to the more limited class of victims capable of identifying the
source of the data loss if they are otherwise representative of the class as a whole.
131. Of the 32% who can establish causation, only 65% will otherwise have a claim for com-
pensable damages, yielding an amount equal to 21% of the total.
132. Approximately 7% of identity theft victims in 2014 reported financial loss in excess of
$100. Id. at 1.  Assuming again that only 32% of these victims will be able to establish causation,
then only 2% of all identity theft victims will be able to recover.
